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Abstract 
The widespread assumption that ‘Europe must speak to China with one voice’ misses important 
advantages of the EU’s divided sovereignty structure. European states frequently secure economic 
benefits from China while deflecting Beijing’s demands for reciprocal policy concessions off to 
Brussels. EU negotiators utilize internal constraints through ‘two-level games’ that strengthen their 
bargaining position with Beijing. EU member states have exploited their dual identities to expand 
engagement with China, attract Chinese investment, and build financial cooperation. The reputed 
downsides of European division often represent either unrealistic expectations or relatively modest 
concerns for Europe. Going forward, European scholars and officials should adopt a more realistic 
sense of what the EU’s China policy might achieve, identify when and why Europeans have been most 
effective in engaging China, and develop strategies to further leverage Europe’s diversity. 
Keywords 
International Relations; Trade, Investment and International Cooperation; European Foreign Policy; 
Institutions and Policy-making 
 
  1 
Introduction 
Europe’s relationship with China appears troubled. Questioning official rhetoric celebrating a 
‘strategic partnership’, Richard Maher writes that ‘EU–China relations are today, and are likely to 
remain, contested, uneven, and…shallow’ reflecting at best a ‘limited partnership’.1 China’s ‘new 
assertiveness’ is raising anxieties, as Beijing seeks to ‘buy up Europe’ while deploying a ‘divide and 
rule’ strategy.2 To respond effectively to the China challenge, experts urge, ‘the EU must learn to 
speak to China with one voice’.3  
If Europe is to constructively engage China, it will have to engage itself collectively first…A lack 
of a clear-cut common vision could become a weakness when dealing with a strong partner which 
has only one…Europeans have to be careful to present a unified response so that China does not 
end up ruling by dividing, carving out concessions in the heart of Europe as an irony of history.
4
  
European Commission’s June 2016 China strategy echoes these concerns, insisting ‘the EU must 
project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China’.5  
The assumption that greater internal coherence will necessarily enhance Europe’s foreign policy 
effectiveness is, however, coming under sharper scrutiny. Greater coherence, Daniel Thomas argues, 
‘is no guarantee that the EU will be able to “punch its weight politically;’” such assumptions are 
‘either misinformed or misleading, or perhaps both’.6 Studies of EU disaster relief and foreign aid, for 
instance, find no clear relationship between internal coherence and effectiveness.
7
 Adopting a single 
approach can even limit effectiveness by preventing member states from using ‘good cop–bad cop’ 
tactics.
8
 ‘At times,’ Sophie Meunier explains, ‘the EU has exploited its disunity strategically in order 
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to increase its bargaining power’.9 In short, the relationship between Europe’s internal coherence and 
its external effectiveness remains ‘ambiguous and still underexplored’.10  
This study builds upon this scholarship by examining European foreign policy toward China: an 
issue area featuring sharp member state competition, low cohesion levels, and limited delegation to the 
EU.
11
 Despite these constraints, Europe’s China policy has been far more effective than most experts 
acknowledge. Europe’s ‘divided sovereignty’ structure has proven useful for both EU and national 
policymakers in bargaining with China.
12
 In negotiating with China over a bilateral investment treaty, 
EU officials have played a two-level game with considerable sophistication and success, extracting 
concessions while resisting Chinese demands. Meanwhile, by deflecting unpalatable decisions off to 
Brussels, national leaders have attracted valuable investments from China without having to concede a 
costly policy quid pro quo.  
Agreement across Europe on China policy is often elusive. In such cases, member states have 
flexibly used their single-country status, forging new modes of cooperation with China before drawing 
upon EU institutions and resources to bolster their influence and protect their interests. European entry 
into the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Eastern European cooperation with China 
exemplify this agile engagement. Moreover, surging Chinese investment across Europe has not 
sparked a destructive race to the bottom, instead encouraging expanded EU-China economic 
cooperation. The reputed downsides of Europe’s divisions—an inability to pry open China’s domestic 
markets, reluctance to refuse China, and vulnerability to Beijing’s ‘divide and conquer’ strategy—
often reflect unrealistic expectations or imprecise analysis.  
This is not a paean to division. Member states cooperating through EU institutions generally better 
advance both national and EU-level interests. Yet European scholars and officials should adopt a more 
realistic sense of what the EU’s China policy might achieve, identify when and why Europeans have 
been most effective in engaging China, and develop strategies to further leverage Europe’s diversity.  
Negotiating with China 
A senior EU official recently shared with me an instructive tale. A few years ago, he attended a EU-
China meeting on currency policy. The EU side included over twenty people: two from each of the 
major EU institutions involved in Euro-related policymaking. Then in walked the China side: one 
person, from the People’s Bank of China. This dichotomy epitomizes the EU’s negotiating 
relationship with China. Authority in the EU is divided, with numerous ‘veto players’ looming over 
any major policy decision. Chinese authority is far more centralized. Does Europe’s internal 
complexity undermine its bargaining power with Beijing?  
Classic bargaining theory explains how having one’s ‘hands tied’ at home, such as by an 
adversarial legislature, can bolster a leader’s demands for concessions from their adversary across the 
bargaining table.
13
 European leaders have used such ‘two-level games’ to strengthen their bargaining 
position with China. Negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) offer a telling example.  
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Playing Two-Level Games  
In May 2013 the EC requested, and quickly secured, a mandate from member states to begin BIT 
negotiations with China. By February 2016, they had held nine rounds of talks and had achieved a 
formal accord on the scope of the final agreement.
14
 Initially, Beijing requested that the two sides 
either negotiate a separate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) simultaneously with the BIT or incorporate 
both trade and investment within a single agreement. China has been relatively successful with its 
other trade partners in this regard, having reached 12 FTAs, including with Switzerland, Iceland, 
ASEAN, South Korea, and Australia, and begun negotiations over six more FTAs, including with 
Norway, and a trilateral FTA with Japan and South Korea.
15
  
Although Europe has also signed or begun negotiating dozens of bilateral FTAs, EU negotiators 
refused Beijing’s request.16 Despite David Cameron’s 2013 pledge in Beijing to ‘put his full weight’ 
behind opening FTA negotiations, the EU has remain unmoved. As one EC official told me: ‘The BIT 
is a necessary precondition before talking about a FTA. There cannot even be an FTA feasibility study 
until the BIT is finalized’.17  
In November 2013, the EU conceded only that ‘negotiating and concluding’ a robust BIT would 
‘convey’ Europe’s ‘willingness to envisage broader ambitions including, once the conditions are right, 
towards a deep and comprehensive FTA, as a longer term perspective’.18 This highly conditional 
pledge offered little reassurance for Beijing, and yet China agreed to embark upon BIT negotiations on 
this basis. Chinese officials also repeatedly suggested to their EU counterparts that their stance in BIT 
negotiations would be ‘greatly helped’ if the EU agreed to recognize China’s market economy status 
(MES).
19
 Yet again, EU officials turned back China’s request: refusing to even mention MES in the 
2013 EU-China 2020 joint statement.
20
  
The EU also successfully shaped the scope of negotiations. Before agreeing to start negotiations, 
EU officials insisted that the BIT must include robust arrangements on market access, national 
treatment (treating European investors as domestic investors even before the investment is formally 
established), and negative lists (excluding only specific Chinese sectors from European investment). In 
its 2012 investment agreements with Canada, and with Japan and South Korea, China successfully 
resisted similar demands for pre-entry national treatment and declined to offer a negative list.
21
 As 
German researchers explain, such measures are ‘clearly beyond the scope of traditional BITs’.22 Yet 
the November 2013 China-EU agreement opening formal negotiations announced that the BIT would 
include ‘investment protection and market access’.23 In February 2016, the EU and China agreed on 
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the scope of the agreement, which will include ‘improved market access opportunities’ and ‘guarantee 
non-discriminatory treatment’, signalling China’s acceptance of the EU’s negative list approach.24 
Given its relatively weak bargaining position, the EU’s success is surprising. As one EC official 
explained to me, ‘the EU needs the BIT more than China, so we lacks leverage’.25 ‘The problem’, 
another added, ‘is the EU is already very open to investment, so what can we offer China?’26 Yet the 
EU played its weak hand strongly, refusing China’s requests to link the BIT to FTA negotiations or to 
MES promises, while successfully shaping the negotiating agenda to suit European preferences. The 
EU’s success stands in sharp contrast to Switzerland and Iceland, who have signed FTAs and offered 
China MES. What explains Europe’s success?  
One reason is obvious: size matters. As a German diplomat to the EU explained: ‘even Germany is 
so much smaller that it needs the EU to gain leverage with China’.27 The EU has also benefitted from 
parallel US demands in the ongoing China-US BIT negotiations: in September 2015, China exchanged 
a negative list with the US—the first time for Beijing.28 Chinese officials favouring a more liberal 
investment regime may also see EU demands as useful external pressure: ‘gaiatsu,’ in the Japanese 
phrase.
29
  
Yet the EU’s most important resource has been its strategic use of internal constraints. Brussels has 
played a two-level game with considerable sophistication and success. From the beginning, member 
states (via the European Council) put their negotiating team on a tight leash. DG Trade was only 
permitted to negotiate an agreement that would ‘secure existing openness and deliver new 
liberalization’ in ‘accessing each other’s investment market,’ ‘improve the treatment of investors…and 
intellectual property rights’, and cover ‘treatment of EU investors in China’ and ensure ‘improved 
access to the Chinese market’.30 A senior Council official confirmed privately that the mandate 
requires that the BIT include ‘strong market access and a “strong protections for EU investors in 
China’.31 
The EU’s internal approval process further ties DG Trade’s hands. The EU Council must formally 
adopt the deal, while Parliament must ratify it. The Parliament, rife with protectionist and anti-China 
sentiment, has established a ‘monitoring group’ overseeing the China BIT talks that raises concerns 
forcefully and directly with DG Trade.
32
 Finally, if the European Court of Justice decides (in a 
pending case) that the EU does not, in fact, have exclusive competence over foreign investment, the 
BIT might require ratification from member state parliaments.
33
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Far from weakening Europe, these internal constraints have bolstered the EU’s negotiating 
position.
34
 DG Trade could credibly claim to their Chinese counterparts that they were unable to even 
discuss a FTA until a favourable BIT is signed; that they were unable to engage in a BIT-for-MES 
trade; and that for the BIT to receive Parliamentary approval, it had to include favourable market 
access conditions. President Xi Jinping’s negotiators have far less credibility in trying to claim parallel 
constraints. As Professor Zhang Xiaotong, from China’s Wuhan University, notes: ‘The EU-China 
BIT is much more than a purely economic exercise, for it involves politics and power’.35 And in this 
case, the complicated internal politics of the EU enhanced European power.  
Europe’s Blame Game  
Competition for Chinese investment, many fear, will compel European leaders to acquiesce in China’s 
policy demands. Yet member states have successfully deflected Beijing’s requests off to Brussels, 
attracting valuable Chinese investment without having to concede a costly policy quid pro quo. A 
telling example comes, fittingly enough, from Machiavelli’s heirs.  
In October 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Rome. Flanked by a smiling Prime Minister 
Matteo Renzi, Li presided over the signing of a dozen new commercial deals worth over €8 billion, 
and announced major agreements with China’s two largest financial institutions. Li assured his Italian 
hosts these deals were ‘merely an appetizer’ with ‘the main course of Sino-Italian cooperation yet to 
come’.36 In exchange, Li encouraged Italy, European Council President at the time, to ‘continue 
playing a constructive role in promoting China-EU ties, which are now at a crucial stage’.37  
Li was referring to China’s MES request.38 Instead, the month after Li’s visit, Deputy Economic 
Development Minister Carlo Calenda told the China Daily that he had promoted the idea of starting 
FTA talks among EU trade ministers.
39
 Before his next China trip, in May 2015, Calenda told Italian 
media: ‘In the pre-council for trade in Brussels I expressed my support for an FTA…the Nordic 
countries’ bloc, Italy, Germany and Spain are not against starting this process’.40 
Only a few months later, Calenda abruptly announced Italy’s opposition to awarding MES to 
China. Insisting that the EU should not ‘unilaterally disarm’ and warning that MES would ‘put entire 
industrial lines of our economy and our continent on its knees’, Calenda bluntly declared: ‘China is 
not a market economy, it doesn’t meet the conditions’.41 Italy thus became the first (and, as of this 
writing, the only) EU member to declare its opposition to MES. In January 2016 Renzi sent Calenda to 
Brussels as Italy’s first non-diplomat to serve as Permanent Representative, where he successfully 
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demanded that the EC conduct a new impact assessment on MES and hold a public consultation 
process.
42
  
Meanwhile, Italy has backed away from its initial support for starting FTA talks: diplomats now 
claim ‘this was never an official policy position’. Despite this remarkable reversal, ‘Italy has not faced 
any additional Chinese pressure or criticism in response to our outspoken stance on MES.’ Instead, 
they describe Italy’s MES stance as useful. ‘At least now there is a debate’.43 
In short, the second-largest recipient of Chinese investment from 2000 to 2015 and the recipient of 
China’s single-largest investment in Europe in 2015 also emerged, in the same year, as the strongest 
opponent of Beijing’s top policy objective in Europe: securing MES.44 In compensation, Renzi offered 
Beijing only fleeting rhetorical support for FTA talks. 
David Cameron adopted a similar tactic. After a year in China’s doghouse for his May 2012 
meeting with the Dalai Lama, in December 2013, the British Prime Minister was finally welcomed in 
Beijing, where he promised to put his ‘full political weight’ behind a China-EU FTA while 
denouncing countries that ‘want to shut China off behind a bamboo curtain of trade barriers’. ‘Britain’, 
Cameron enthused, ‘wants China to realize its dream’.45 The 120 UK firms accompanying Cameron 
were rewarded with trade and investment deals signed during the visit worth over £5.6 billion.
46
 
In October 2015, Xi Jinping returned the favour, traveling to the UK for a leisurely four-day visit, 
where he presided over deals promising £30 billion of Chinese investment into the UK. On the last 
day, in four hours of private talks at the prime minister’s country residence, Xi told Cameron what he 
wanted in exchange. ‘The EU is a comprehensive strategic partner for China and is China’s largest 
trading partner’, Xi reminded Cameron. ‘China hopes Britain, as an important member of the EU, can 
play an even more positive and constructive role in promoting the deepening development of China-
EU ties’.47 Just as Jonathan Fenby warned: ‘Xi may come to London bearing gifts, but…he will want a 
quid pro quo in terms of political support’.48  
In fact, Cameron had already promised, back in 2010 in Beijing: ‘I will make the case for China to 
get market economy status in the EU’.49 Yet he failed to reiterate this position during, or after, Xi’s 
visit. Instead, just weeks after Xi left London, Cameron reassured the UK Parliament that ‘even if 
China gets that [MES] status…it can be fined’, adding: ‘If there is illegal dumping, we will support 
action in the European Union, and that can be done in spite of the status that a country has’.50  
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Like Renzi, Cameron appeased Beijing with vague FTA pledges while assuaging domestic 
constituencies by talking tough on MES. Able to deflect difficult decisions off to Brussels, both 
leaders successfully attracted Chinese investments without policy concessions. Playing deflection and 
two-level games offer negative advantages. Yet the EU’s divided sovereignty framework has also 
enabled European states to utilize their dual identities—as sovereign states and EU members—to forge 
cooperation with China even when EU-level accord proves elusive.  
Europe’s Agile Engagement  
Member states’ distinct economic structures and priorities, exacerbated by competition for Chinese 
investment and markets, generate diverging preferences over China policy. The EU’s cumbersome 
structures often prove unable to bridge these divides. Facing such impasses, member states can exploit 
their national autonomy to enter cooperative arrangements with China. Once inside the tent, they 
utilize EU institutions to bolster their collective influence. European entry into the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) exemplifies such agile diplomacy.  
AIIB: Getting Inside the Tent 
President Xi Jinping first publically proposed the AIIB in October 2013, setting 31 March 2015 as the 
deadline to join as a ‘prospective founding member’ (PFM). By early March, a number of EU 
members signalled their intent to meet that deadline. The UK reportedly told Chinese officials that 
they would announce their application on 17 March. Once other European countries learned of 
Britain’s intent, they quickly followed suit. In the end, Luxembourg beat London by one day, formally 
applying for membership on 11 March, followed by the UK, and then Switzerland on 13 March.
51
 
Three days later, France, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement announcing their intent to join.
52
 
By the end of the month, fourteen EU members had applied for PFM status. 
To many in Europe, the AIIB represents an embarrassing failure. Thomas Renard denounced 
Europe’s ‘apparent rush’ as having ‘no coordination’.53 ‘Beijing stole a strategic win over Europe’, 
complained two German experts, as Europeans ‘tumbled over one another to court Beijing’.54 EC 
President Jean-Claude Juncker denounced this ‘race to see who is first to become a member’.55 The 
EC’s own think tank criticized ‘Europe’s response’ as ‘uncoordinated and ad hoc’.56 
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In fact, there was considerable deliberation and communication among member states and between 
member states and EU officials, reflecting Europeans’ ‘habit of cooperation.’57 In the fall of 2013, 
Chinese officials directly approached a number of leading EU member states to encourage them to 
join. German officials immediately shared this information with EC officials in Beijing, who then 
shared this information with all other EU members. As one senior EC official involved in the Beijing 
discussions explained:  
The AIIB is an absolutely natural development. It is an example of China seeking to shape the 
global order, and it is to be expected…I was happy to facilitate member states joining the bank. 
Our main principal is that there should be equal treatment among all member states, so we focused 
on sharing information among all of them.
58
  
Naturally, member states justified their decisions by arguing that they would shape the institution in a 
positive direction.
59
 We can assess these claims against the AIIB’s voting distribution, leadership 
appointments, and foundational documents.  
The AIIB’s 57 founding members include 20 ‘non-regional’ states: 17 are European (14 EU 
members). No other non-Asian OECD countries have joined, giving Europeans a monopoly of the 
non-Asian, wealthy members of AIIB. Europe’s combined vote share of 22.09 is second only to China 
(26.06) and far ahead of India (7.51), Russia (5.93), Brazil (3.02), and Australia (3.46)—combined.60  
The AIIB’s 12-member Board of Directors is responsible for daily operations. Of the three 
positions reserved for non-Asian countries, two are set aside for Europe: one for Eurozone countries 
and one for ‘other European states.’ The first Board includes a German (Nikolai Putscher) and a UK 
official (Vanessa MacDougal).
61
 Of the AIIB’s five Vice-Presidents: two are Europeans. The UK’s 
Danny Alexander is VP and Corporate Secretary, a position described as ‘trusted advisor, 
communications and liaison officer, and overall governance professional’. Germany’s Joachim von 
Amsberg, a World Bank Vice President, is VP for Policy and Strategy, responsible for the AIIB’s 
‘strategic agenda, investment portfolio, and operational policies’.62  
With Europeans’ entry, the AIIB created a tension between non-Asian, wealthy countries with 
strong opinions about development assistance and developing Asian countries hungry for rapid aid 
with few preconditions. Europeans are already exerting considerable weight on this balance, evident in 
the AIIB’s Operating Principles pledge: ‘The Bank shall place no restriction upon the procurement of 
goods and services from any country’.63 The AIIB has also issued a 50-page ‘Environment and Social 
Framework’ that ‘comprises mandatory environmental and social requirements for each Project’.64 
These policies more closely reflect the values espoused by European development agencies than 
China’s development program.65  
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Soon after EU members announced their intent to join, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development President Suma Chakrabarti revealed that the EBRD had already established an ‘intense 
and wide-ranging dialogue’ with the AIIB.66 In January 2016, Chakrabarti attended the AIIB’s 
inauguration ceremony, where he finalized China’s EBRD membership.67 Reflecting these thickening 
ties, in June 2016, the AIIB and EBRD announced their first co-funded project.
68
 The EBRD is not 
alone: the European Investment Bank (EIB) has also seconded staff to the AIIB, opened an office in 
Beijing, and is exploring co-financing.
69
  
The EBRD and EIB are serving as ‘force multipliers’: facilitating coordination among EU 
members while deploying their institutional resources to help Europeans shape AIIB rules and 
practices. Eastern Europeans’ response to China’s ‘16+1’ initiative can be seen in a similarly positive 
light. 
China’s Eastern Engagement  
The China-CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) Partnership (‘16+1’) began in April 2012 
with an Economic and Trade Forum in Warsaw. A Secretariat was soon established in Beijing, with 
‘Guidelines for China-CEEC Cooperation’ issued at summit meetings in November 2013 in 
Bucharest, December 2014 in Belgrade, and November 2015 in Suzhou.
70
 The framework brings 
together 16 countries, including five non-EU members.
71
 It is primarily an annual summit of national 
leaders, underpinned by a nascent but thickening web of linkages designed to foster economic 
cooperation.
72
 In 2012 Beijing established a $10 billion China-CEE Investment Cooperation Fund; 
then added an additional $3 billion two years later.  
To date, actual Chinese investment in CEE countries has remained ‘modest’: only in Hungary is 
aggregate Chinese investment above one per cent of GDP.
73
 Chinese experts admit that China’s 
‘insignificant’ investment into CEE has proven ‘a source of disappointment for some Central 
European countries’.74 Beijing’s efforts to expand investment into CEE countries have been ‘beset 
with difficulties’, deriving from Chinese inexperience, unrealistic expectations on both sides, and a 
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lack of enthusiasm or capacity in many CEE states.
75
 Most of China’s CEE infrastructure projects are 
actually bilateral: the most significant regional project is the ambitious, but still highly uncertain, 
Belgrade-Budapest High-Speed Railway.
76
  
‘Over the past three years’, Premier Li Keqiang claimed in November 2015, ‘16+1 cooperation, 
just like a high-speed train, has set out on its journey and gained speed all the way from Warsaw to 
Bucharest, and from Belgrade to Suzhou’.77 In fact, the CEEC train has moved far slower than Beijing 
hoped. The 2015 Suzhou Summit’s slogan of ‘a new beginning, new domains and a new vision’, only 
three years after its inception, highlights the considerable obstacles facing China’s CEEC initiative.  
Yet western European experts describe Beijing’s initiative as ‘disconcerting’ and ‘alarming’.78 
Jonathan Holslag warns that the 16+1 initiative ‘confirms how weak the EU is at the moment’ and 
signals that ‘the EU as a collective is losing credibility’.79 ‘16+1 is a direct attack on European 
sovereignty’, one German diplomat insisted. ‘Beijing has a ‘One China’ policy: we should have a 
‘One EU’ policy, and insist that China respect this’.80  
In fact, the 11 EU member states do not require Brussels’ approval to seek outside investment, and 
as the EU’s poorest members, have a far greater need for infrastructure funding.81 Banding together in 
this configuration enhances their attractiveness to Chinese investors. Countries such as Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic—among the EU’s poorest and least powerful members—emerge as 
the wealthiest, most stable, and influential countries within the CEEC. Indeed, these three are the 
largest recipients of Chinese investment among the 16.
82
  
Much of Europe’s anxiety assumes that the initiative will erode the EU’s influence and European 
values. EC officials are particularly concerned that CEE recipients of Chinese-funded projects might 
favour Chinese firms, thus contravening EU public procurement rules. DG Competition, which can 
fine EU members and issue critical reports on EU candidates, reportedly is investigating CEEC-related 
procurements. Yet even within EU rules, as one EC official admitted ruefully, ‘tenders can be written 
quite creatively’.83 
China’s CEEC initiative is unlikely to erode the EU’s influence or attractiveness in the region. 
China is drawn to the region largely due to the CEE countries’ access to the EU’s internal market. 
From 2003 to 2015, the bulk of China’s large FDI projects in the Balkan region went to three EU 
member states: Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece.
84
 The largest non-EU recipient of Chinese FDI among 
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the 16 CEE members, Serbia, is attractive to China primarily because of its free trade agreements with 
the EU and status as a EU candidate country.
85
 EC officials also worry that non-EU members such as 
Serbia may take on unsustainable levels of Chinese debt that the EU is forced to absorb in the future. 
Yet Serbian officials are already resisting Chinese efforts to include state guarantees in their loan 
conditions due to Belgrade’s concerns with financial risks.86 
Unlike Britain or Greece, none of the CEEC’s eleven EU members have threatened to leave the 
EU. They benefit disproportionately from the EU’s net financial transfers, currency stability, and their 
privileged access to capital, labour, and commodity markets. Instead, they have parlayed their EU 
status to attract Chinese attention, which in turn has stimulated new EU infrastructure funding linking 
CEE countries to Western Europe.
87
  
Suspicion that China intentionally selected a mixed EU/non-EU grouping to undermine or pressure 
the EU also misunderstands China’s motivations. As Chinese experts explain, all 16 are former 
socialist states, many of which reacted to the end of Soviet influence by becoming virulently anti-
Communist, criticizing China’s policies on Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights.88 By 2012, Chinese 
leaders saw an opportunity to act in Eastern Europe as they did in Asia and elsewhere: establishing a 
new sub-regional grouping where China would play a catalytic role by providing new investment for 
regional infrastructure, yielding diplomatic, economic, and strategic benefits for Beijing.  
Yet just as in Asia and Africa, Chinese leaders underestimated the anxiety their initiative would 
spark in Brussels. In his April 2012 Warsaw speech, Premier Wen Jiaobao’s four-point proposal failed 
to even mention the EU, instead encouraging CEE countries to ‘inject new vitality for the development 
of China-Europe relations’.89 EU leaders quickly signalled their strong concerns to Beijing and CEE 
members.
90
 In response, the 2014 Belgrade Guidelines promised that all China-CEEC initiatives 
would parallel the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda and pledged that all 11 EU members would act 
‘in accordance with…EU legislation, regulations and policies’.91 The subsequent Suzhou Guidelines 
further ‘welcomed and supported’ recent EU-China agreements and welcomed EU officials as 
observers.
92
  
In sum, like their western counterparts, Central and Eastern European states utilized the EU’s 
divided sovereignty structure in creative fashion, advancing their national interests with limited 
negative impact upon fellow EU members or the EU itself. While outside observers denounced 
China’s perfidy and bemoaned European divisions, EU officials rose to the challenge. 
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Building Cooperation 
Stimulated perhaps by their perceived failure to develop a coherent EU-level response to China’s 
CEEC and AIIB initiatives, EU officials responded to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative 
in proactive fashion, establishing in June 2015 a ‘EU-China Connectivity Platform’ designed to 
‘capture the synergies’ between OBOR and the EU’s Investment Plan for Europe.93 By March 2016, a 
working group bringing experts from China’s Silk Road Fund and National Development and Reform 
Commission together with EC and EIB officials had already met three times.
94
 According to a 
participating EC official, China sent ‘extremely high quality people—professional and experienced. It 
shows that Beijing is taking this very seriously’.95 
In mid-April 2016, EC and Chinese officials announced that China would soon begin its pledged 
contribution of between €5 and €10 billion to the European Fund for Strategic Investments: the first 
non-EU state to announce its participation (the largest national contributor has been the UK, with €8.5 
billion).
96
 The EFSI agreement is just one of the EU’s recent economic accords with China.97 In 
September 2015 the EC and China signed a ‘milestone’ agreement on fifth-generation 
telecommunications.
98
 The European Central Bank (ECB) also secured China’s largest currency swap 
agreement outside of Asia.
99
  
Meanwhile, fears that that competition among member states to attract Chinese investment would 
spark a destructive ‘race to the bottom’ have not materialized. ‘The challenges posed by [Chinese] 
inflows are widely overblown’, argues Françoise Nicolas.100 Sophie Meunier agrees. ‘The dreaded 
impact on European labor has not happened’. Instead of dismantling firms, ‘Chinese acquisitions have 
often been accompanied by investment in equipment and facilities by the Chinese parent company to 
modernize the existing European company’.101 ‘The Chinese appear to be investing for a longer term’, 
an Italian economic official told me. ‘Despite our concerns, things have gone pretty well’. Member 
state competition has sparked innovative efforts to attract Chinese investment, such as the joint 
investment vehicles created by Italy, France, and Belgium for Chinese investors.
102
 As a result, Europe 
has emerged as the second-largest recipient of China’s overseas investment.103 
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Downsides of Division? 
Europeans’ most ubiquitous concern is that a lack of unity undermines the EU’s capacity to pressure 
China—particularly in expanding market access. According to the OECD, China has the world’s most 
restrictive regime on inward foreign investment.
104
 The European Chamber of Commerce has 
denounced China’s ‘reform and closing up’.105 Public procurement is of particular concern. Beijing 
has made five bids to enter the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement, but none have been accepted 
by the EU or the US.
106
 Frustrated by its inability to pry open Chinese markets, in June 2016, the EC’s 
new China Strategy declared: ‘The fundamental principle of the EU's relationship with China is that it 
should be based on reciprocal benefit in both political and economic terms’.107 Yet if Beijing fails to 
offer satisfactory concessions, as is likely, Europe may end up eroding its longstanding openness 
toward foreign investment for scant benefit. 
The obstacles are partly structural: Europe’s divided sovereignty renders it better at resisting 
demands for concessions than at compelling change through negotiations.
108
 However, the US, a far 
more coherent bargaining partner, has also been unsuccessful in many of its market access demands in 
China. Modest increases in EU cohesion are unlikely to prove decisive, particularly given the high 
political and economic stakes within China today. Instead, this is likely to be an ongoing negotiating 
point of some difficulty—for Brussels as it is for Washington.  
A second fear is that internal divisions render European’s vulnerable to Beijing’s ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy.109 Yet Meunier finds ‘no evidence of a master plan to turn EU countries one against 
the other’.110 While careful to avoid appearing to intervene in Europeans’ domestic affairs, Chinese 
leaders encouraged both Greece and the UK to remain inside the EU. Furthermore, Beijing has hardly 
neglected Brussels: since 2009 China’s two top leaders have spent more time in Brussels than US 
President Barack Obama.
111
 Following China’s timely investments and currency purchases amidst the 
Euro crisis, George Soros declared: ‘China saved the Euro’.112 The EU is China’s largest customer and 
hosts a growing share of Chinese investments: Beijing’s interests are for ‘a prosperous EU, a united 
Europe and a strong Europe’.113 
Others worry that Europeans cannot stand up to Beijing unless they stand together. Yet recent 
scholarship shows that China’s economic statecraft has failed to influence key European policy 
decisions.
114
 National leaders remain willing to reject Chinese investments as strategically or 
politically inappropriate, evident in Prime Minster Theresa May’s delay on the Hinkley nuclear 
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project.
115
 European determination is even stronger on trade. The EU is the WTO’s third most frequent 
user of trade defence instruments: 56 of its 73 anti-dumping measures apply to China.
116 
In response to 
domestic pressures, EU officials have imposed stiff anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese steel imports.
117
 
Protectionist forces are surging across Europe, evident in the Parliament’s May 2016 resolution 
opposing MES for China.
118
 Europeans have hardly dropped their guard in the face of China’s 
economic challenge.  
Conclusions 
European leaders at the national and EU levels have utilized the EU’s divided sovereignty structure in 
strategic fashion, resisting Chinese demands for policy concessions through two-level games and 
deflection strategies, while maneuvering between the two levels to forge new modes of cooperation 
and attract investment from China. Member states’ reluctance to delegate authority to Brussels may 
undermine the EU’s reputation as a credible negotiating partner, while competition for Chinese 
markets and investment can erode trust. Europeans have not achieved all their ambitions in China, 
particularly in market access. Yet given the EU’s structural limitations and entrenched economic 
differences across member states, exacerbated by severe economic and political challenges, Europe’s 
China policy should be seen as reasonably successful. 
Since its 2003 ‘Communication on China’, the EC has struggled to “Europeanize” relations with 
China ‘so that the EU speaks with a single voice on all key issues of China policy’.119 This initiative 
has successfully focused Beijing’s attention upon Brussels, bolstered EU-China cooperation, 
encouraged member states’ ‘habits of cooperation’, and emboldened the EU to resist Chinese pressure. 
Yet retaining a myopic ‘single voice’ approach risks missing the opportunity to leverage Europe’s 
diversity. Member states’ ‘mini-lateral’ initiatives can yield valuable benefits at limited cost, as the 
CEEC and AIIB cases demonstrate.
120
 Europeans should reconsider the benefits of a more flexible 
approach, envisioned in their 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with China, which declared 
member states ‘entirely free to engage in bilateral activities in the field of economic cooperation and to 
conclude new economic cooperation agreements with China where appropriate’.121 National efforts to 
attract Chinese investment, for instance, should be encouraged to develop in parallel with EU 
initiatives such as the Connectivity Platform. 
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